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NEW ISSUES AND NEW INTEREST
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA
Joseph B. McDevitt
The past 2 years have witnessed an
intense national and international debate over major issues in the law of the
sea. The legal questions connected with
man's increasing desire to exploit the
living and mineral resources of the seas
and ocean floor have occasioned particular interest both domestically and
abroad.
At home several bodies, which I will
mention later, have devoted their activities to these questions. Internationally,
the increased activities of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (1M CO)
have been supplemented by debates at
the 22nd Session of the General Assembly which resulted in a new 3S-nation
United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on
the Seabeds. The United Nations General Assembly will again address these
problems this fall. Indeed, each week
brings a report of new scientific or
commercial interest in the resources of
the sea and ocean floor. The imagination of Jules Verne 100 years ago in
Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the
Sea is finally being outstripped by actual technology. The future is projected
in the context of scientific research and
technology infinitely more exciting than
the literary entertainment of science
fiction. Using the commonly accepted

U.S. measure of importance-the almighty dollar-it is reported that
current economic activity in just that
portion of the sea area known as the
Continental Shelf is in the magnitude of
multibillions of dollars.
The dramatic increase in the national
and international efforts being made in
this area directly reflects the increased
attention being focused on the Continental Shelf and deep ocean floor by
previously disinterested nations. This
increased interest and involvement
carries important implications for many
of the Navy's ocean-based activities.
If the deliberations on near shore and
deep ocean seabed problems could be
described in a single word, that word
would be diversity; diversity of desires,
of technological capabilities, and of
expectations. In addition to navigational
and related uses, the ocean waters and
the bed of the sea are now commercially
producing oil and gas, salt, bromine,
magnesium, sulphur, and other minerals,
not to mention the vast variety of
products of the fishing industry. It is
not surprising that legal principles
proposed for this new frontier are as
numerous and divergent as its material
potential.
There are numerous national positions as to the importance and priority
to be attached to the establishment of
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legal principles in the ocean environment Thus, it has unquestionably become an arena in which private and
governmental interest is generating pressure for development and legal change.
Domestically such pressures resulted
in passage of the Marine Resources and
Engineering Development Act in 1966.
This act established a Cabinet-level National Council on Marine Resources and
Engineering Development and a Commission on Marine Science, Engineering
and Resources. The Navy, from the
Secretarial level down, has played a
major role in the deliberations of the
Council, Commission, and the many
subordinated interagency working
bodies established under them. The
Office of the Judge Advocate General
has been consulted more and more
frequently as the legal facets of technological and scientific problems became
apparent
While the National Council and the
Commission has focused primarily on
the long-range needs of a national
oceanographic program, there has been
a dramatic increase in the tempo of
ocean-oriented activities at all levels of
the U.S. Government New international
involvement in the area of oceanography is well illustrated by the resolution introduced by Malta at the United
Nations in the summer of 1967. This
resolution proposed restricting use of
the seabed to peaceful purposes and
establishment of a legal regime which
would insure that the proceeds of deep
ocean mineral wealth would be used to
aid developing countries.
This and other proposals pointed up
the need in the U.S. Government for a
high-level permanent interagency committee which could focus on the dayto-day problems of preparing and presenting U.S. positions in relation to the
Continental Shelf and deep ocean floors
in various international forums. This
need was met this past February by the
creation of the Interagency Committee
on International Policy in the Marine

Environment under the chairmanship of
the Deputy Under-Secretary of State.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research and Development) is the Department of Defense representative on
this committee.
The Continental Shelf and deep
ocean floor questions required immediate attention by the new Interagency
Committee both because of the ongoing
meetings of the United Nations Committee on the Seabeds, which was established following the Malta resolution,
and because numerous private groups
and Government agencies were urgently
seeking clarification of the jurisdictional
limits of the U.S. Continental Shelf.
Accordingly, a Working Group on the
Shelf and Deep Ocean Floor, abbreviated as SADOF, was established. I have
been privileged to be appointed the
Department of Defense representative
on this working group.
The active role played by the Department of Defense, and particularly the
Navy, in the long-range studies and
policy planning work of the National
Council, the Commission, and the Interagency Committee is surprising and disturbing to some. This reaction is based
on the fact that most of the broad range
of oceanographic problems concerns
civil or peaceful uses of the oceanic
environment, with particular emphasis
on the extraction of its mineral and
living resources. There are, however,
several good reasons for the interest and
concern of the Department of Defense
and, in particular, the Navy.
First, the Navy manages numerous
programs which have potential civilian
as well as military applications. Its
well-known Man-in-the-Sea program
alone is developing numerous new tech·
niques useful in many phases of the
offshore oil industry. In fact, the Navy
spends approximately half of all governmental monies available within the
United States for scientific research and
technology development which have
oceanic applications.
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Second, it is-reasonable to assume
that the military will play an important
role in affording protection to U.S.
citizens and to their personal property
that may be placed on the seabed of the
Continental Shelf, or beyond, to be
used in scientific or extractive operations. It is important, therefore, for the
Department of Defense to understand
the needs and rights of such operators
so that the protection afforded will be
both reasonable and lawful and thus
minimize the risk of conflict.
The third reason for our interest is
that it is important that modes of
accommodation be developed to insure
that military activities do not unreasonably interfere with new usages or impede future progress made possible
through new technology. Already, new
means of coordinating oil drilling operations and Navy weapons testing along
the California coast have been found.
The fourth and most compelling reason for the Navy's direct interest and
concern with these developments is that
implementation of many proposals
would create an implicit acceptance of
additional constraints and controls on
military activities. Proposals which
would, on the one hand, increase national jurisdiction over coastal waters, in
a qualitative or quantitative sense, or,
on the other hand, place the seabed of
the deep oceans under the control of an
international agency could have a significant impact on the historic principle
of freedom of the seas. It is of particular
importance to avoid arrangements
which would result in the degradation
of the right of warships and submarines
to navigate on and under the high seas.
Any arrangements-if they are to be
reflective of our overall national interests-must recognize that the oceans are,
and will continue to be, vital to our
national security.
Thus, Navy participation in our national deliberations has been considered
both necessary and desirable to ensure
that national security interests are fully

considered in the course of developing
both long-range criteria and immediate
policy initiatives.
During the past year it has become
increasingly clear that fundamental
issues of international law of the sea are
intertwined with and underlie the development of a comprehensive oceanographic program. Virtually all arrangements being discussed either rely on or
modify historic principles of international law. Accordingly, the lawyers
within the various agencies have played
an increasingly active role in the consideration of these issues.
The most immediate area of interest
to international lawyers is the Continental Shelf. This area, in geological
terms, is the extension of the continental mass which gently slopes out from
the world's coasts. It extends in some
places further than 200 miles before a
sudden break in grade, normally located
at about the 200-meter depth curve,
plunges into the deep ocean abyss. The
Continental Shelf is most easily accessible to man's developing marine technology; and lawyers are now compelled
to consider its legal status by the burgeoning commercial and scientific
activity made possible by its relatively
shallow superadjacent waters.
The Shelf and Deep Ocean Floor
Working Group referred to previously
which, by the way, is composed primarily of lawyers, is presently engaged
in developing recommendations on two
fundamental questions of mixed policy
and law. One is the question of how and
where the outer limit of the regime of
the Continental Shelf should be further
delineated. The second is what type of
legal regime should be negotiated regarding the ocean seabed and its resources beyond the outer limit of the
Continental Shelf.
President Truman initiated the Continental Shelf regime in 1945 when he
unilaterally proclaimed that the United
States would exercise exclusive jurisdiction and control over the natural re-
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sources of the seabed and subsoil of our
adjacent Continental Shelf. In a press
release which accompanied the Truman
Proclamation, the area was described as
including all of the ocean floor "contiguous to" the coasts of the United
States to a depth of 600 feet-which is
approximately 200 meters.
A mere 13 years later the Continental Shelf regime was codified by the
1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The Convention, however,
describes the outer boundary of the
regime in somewhat less than precise
terms.
Article 1 provides that the term
"Continental Shelf" refers to the seabed
and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coasts but outside the
area of the territorial sea to a depth of
200 meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superadjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas. Thus
the Continental Shelf regime becomes
applicable beyond the 200 meter isobath as new technology such as new
types of Texas Towers or even completely submerged installations allows
commercial extraction of oil and gas
resources at greater depths. This, of
course, is an open ended definitiondepth of 200 meters or depth of exploitability .
The exploitability test does not meet
the normal legal requirements of certainty. However, it does have the advantage of flexibility and makes the Convention applicable without change to
future situations brought about by new
technology. Of course, this second criterion tends to make the scope of the
Convention ambiguous and has already
created heated discussions and divergent
views among international lawyers.
As the U.S. Department of Interior
has already leased areas beyond the 200
meter isobath, the question of the permissible scope of the exploitability test
is no longer academic. Considering the
emerging technological capabilities

possessed by the United States and
other leading maritime powers and the
fact that the Convention by its own
terms is open for amendment in 1969,
the Department of Defense has agreed
that the question should be examined as
to how the rather vague exploitability
criterion should be modified. Accordingly, the United States tabled several
months ago a proposal before the
United Nations Committee on the
Seabeds that there should be established
as soon as practicable an internationally
agreed, precise boundary between the
deep ocean floor and the regime of the
Continental Shelf. This, then, is the
basis for urgency behind the first of the
specific tasks assigned to the Working
Group on the Shelf and Deep Ocean
Floor-to develop a recommended U.S.
position on the question of how the
Continental Shelf outer boundary
should be established and where it
should be.
At least four "legal" issues are basic
to an evaluation of the relative desirability of various proposed outer
boundaries, and the working group deliberations have revolved around these
issues to date.
The first is an examination of the
qualitative nature of the present Continental Shelf regime. That is, what rights
and duties does the Convention on the
Continental Shelf impose upon a nation
possessing a Continental Shelf, and do
these rights and duties apply to nonsignatory nations? Numerous questions
remain under the Convention regarding
types of allowable scientific research
activities and other matters. The desirability of an outer boundary formula
which produces a broad Continental
Shelf depends, for a maritime nation
with worldwide interests such as the
United States, in large part upon the
types of activities on and over the shelf
regime which can be regulated and how
they can be regulated. In this regard the
relevancy of applicable domestic legislation must also be determined.
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Closely related to this question is the
effect which the location of a boundary
will have on traditional freedoms of the
sea exercised either within the waters
over the shelf or outside the new boundary. What types of new limitations on
transits by surface vessels will develop,
for example? The establishment of a
precise boundary in and of itself might
stimulate nations to increase the degree
of control they exercise over events
landward of that boundary, but it might
also tend to insure that events seaward
of the boundary were protected from at
least some types of claims to national
jurisdiction.
Thirdly, what impact will the boundary have on the difficulties or chances
of effectuating a satisfactory regime for
the exploitation of the resources beyond the boundary? If the boundary is
far seaward, for example, there are few
known resources whose exploitation
would be affected by a deep ocean
regime in the near future.
Finally, by what methods or procedures may the boundary be changed?
Is it possible, in other words, to establish a precise boundary through interpretation of the Shclf Convention, or is
further legislation or a new treaty necessary to alter the status quo? In this
regard it should be noted that though
there is little specific reference to how
far and how deep the shelf regime could
extend under the exploitability criterion
in the 1958 Convention working documents and debates, it would seem that
the exploitability test of the Convention
is, in fact, limited by the requirement of
reasonable proximity to the coast and
reasonable relationship to the geologic
Continental Shelf.
The question as to what the most
desirable limit should be-from the
standpoint of national security-is a
complex one. The qualitative nature of
lawful restrictions upon military activities sought to be undertaken on a
foreign Continental Shelf are not yet
clearly defined. It is clear, however, that

military activities may not be undertaken on or above a foreign shelf which
would interfere with that nation's right
to explore its shelf or exploit its resources.
,
The Navy is presently examining the
military implications of various proposals for specific outer limits. These
proposals range from 200 meters to
4,000 meters in depth and from 50
miles to 200 miles from shore or a
combination of both depth and distance
criteria. Without attempting to prejudge
the conclusion of these Navy studies
and the work of SAD OF, the general
conclusion appears warranted that a
relatively narrow Continental Shelf
regime would best serve the security
interests of the United States. The
conclusion that our military interests
are best served by a restrictive definition
is to a considerable extent, however,
based upon the nature of an agreed deep
ocean regime that will evolve beyond
the Continental Shelf.
Our SADOF Working Group has also
been tasked to develop recommendations regarding a regime for the deep
oceans beyond the Continental Shelf. In
this connection the United States recently tabled at the U.N. Committee on
the Seabeds certain basic principles to
be used as a basis for internationally
agreed arrangements for the exploitation and use by states of the deep ocean
floor and its subsoil. The fundamental
principle proposed was that no state
may claim or exercise sovereign rights
over any part of the deep ocean floor.
This is not to say that the exploration and use of the deep ocean floor or
the exploitation of its resources are
prohibited. The deep ocean floor may
be used for 'nonmilitary or military
activities under existing principles of
international law pursuant to the concept of the freedom of the seasrecognizing, of course, that reasonable
regard must be given to the interest of
other states in their exercise of high seas
freedoms. In addition, there is agree-
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ment among most international lawyers
that minerals lying beyond the regime
of the Continental Shelf may be lawfully exploited, and the exploiter is
entitled to keep what he finds.
A question does exist, however, as to
whether an individual or nation may
claim some form of interest in areas
adjacent to an exploitative activity and,
if so, how large such areas can be. In
this regard it is reasonable to conclude
that in the not too distant future,
clarification of such rights will be necessary in order to render deep ocean
exploitative operations both feasible
and profitable.
The development of a specialized
system for the exploitation of resources
varying from the high seas rights mentioned a moment ago is predicated on
the assumption that a regime that vests
an exclusive right to the resources only
after they are extracted is not reflective
of the economic needs of the exploiter
of mineral resources. Quite frankly, it is
also predicated on the assumption that a
system should be devised which will
permit all nations to share in the ocean's
wealth-either directly or indirectly.
There are at present many possible
regimes under consideration. They
generally fall into the following categories:
First, the Flag state proposal: Under
this system the nation would assume
responsibility over an exploitative
operation as if it were conducted on a
vessel of its registry. The state of the
exploiter would have a protective interest in the resource to be exploited
within a reasonable area.
Secondly, an International registry:

Under the system an international
agency would register a national claim
with some authority regarding competing claims, thus validating the state's
claim.
Thirdly, complete Internationalization: Under this system an international
agency would "own" the resources of
the seabed of the deep oceans. In effect,
permission from the agency would be
necessary before any exploitation took
place.
A combination of these alternatives
is also possible. For example, some form
of international registry of claims in
conjunction with a system of flag state
jurisdiction and control deserves serious
consideration. From the national
security standpoint, such a system
might even be advantageous for it might
tend to reduce the risk of economic
conflict or territorial claims and, at the
same time, not materially interfere with
or constrain peacetime military activities and deployments.
The final choice of the most favorable deep ocean regime alternative has
not been made in SADOF or other
national forums. As with the question
of a precise outer boundary for the
Continental Shelf, much work remains
before the solution most beneficial to
our composite national interest is
found. In the course of this work,
however, one underlying fact stands
out-the oceans are becoming more, not
less, essential to the security and wellbeing of most, if not all, of the peoples
of the world. And this fact alone dictates that we should be more, not less,
deliberate at arriving at irreversible decisions.
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